Michael Calderbank
parla con l'economista marxista Costas Lapavitsas prima della
pubblicazione del suo provocatorio nuovo libro Il caso di sinistra
contro l'UE.
... La politica realistica inizia in casa. Comincia da casa,
inizia con cose che puoi comandare e cose che puoi cambiare. Su
questo si costruisce l'internazionalismo...
Costas Lapavitsas
Il
libro è ovviamente una critica dell'UE nella sua forma attuale. E'
una valutazione di dove si trova il sindacato, di cosa è diventato,
e della sua probabile direzione.
È un tentativo di dire che la
sinistra non dovrebbe avere nulla a che fare con la difesa di questo
insieme di istituzioni.
Dovrebbe assumere una posizione critica e di
rifiuto. Affermo che questo è l'unico modo per sviluppare una
politica radicale in Europa, un programma economico e sociale
radicale e internazionalista.
Il ritorno più evidente sarebbe che le forze che minacciano di
distruggere l'UE - i populisti in Italia, o l'AfD in Germania - sono
anti-immigrante, di destra, e che se l'UE si disintegra, sarà il
diritto che ne beneficia. Come risponderebbe a questo?
Lapavitas
Permettetemi di dire all'inizio che, ovviamente, non dovremmo avere
nulla a che fare con queste forze reazionarie e razziste. Dovremmo
opporci a tutti i livelli.
Ma per capire perché sono diventate così
potenti, e per capire cosa dovremmo fare, dobbiamo cominciare
dall'Unione europea stessa. L'emergere di queste forze non è
casuale. Ha a che fare con ciò che è diventata l'Unione europea.
Solo partendo da questa prospettiva possiamo capire cosa dovrebbe
fare la sinistra.
Allora perché
l'estrema destra è così potente e l'Unione europea in questo Stato?
La prima cosa da apprezzare è che l'Unione europea affronta una
crisi esistenziale diversa da quella del passato. Va al cuore di ciò
che è, di ciò che fa e di ciò che serve. E' una crisi che è il
risultato della profonda trasformazione avvenuta dopo Maastricht.
Maastricht è stato
un momento chiave.
Quello che è successo da allora è che l'UE è
emersa come un difensore senza compromessi del capitale contro il
lavoro, un promotore del neoliberismo, con un insieme molto rigido di
meccanismi che si fa strada attraverso ogni tipo di opposizione.
Questa non è l'alleanza delle nazioni, il partenariato dei popoli e
tutte le altre parole di fantasia che la gente continua a immaginare
a sinistra in Gran Bretagna - spesso con richiami alla fine degli
anni Ottanta, Jacques Delors e così via.
Oggi l'Unione europea ha
solo un debole legame con quei tempi.
Ha scavato la democrazia in
Europa. Ha eliminato la sovranità popolare e ha alienato i poveri e
la classe operaia di un paese dopo l'altro.
Il risultato politico è
quello che si vede. È una reazione viscerale, da sotto, che va a
destra perché la sinistra non offre prospettive alternative.
Calderbank La
sorprende il modo in cui si svolge il dibattito sulla sinistra in
Gran Bretagna? Le dirigenze sindacali, ad esempio, indicherebbero una
base almeno vestigiale di protezioni sociali ed economiche, o di
protezione ambientale. Sostengono che, anche se sono stati attaccati,
esistono ancora in misura maggiore di quanto non avvenga in un
esperimento di Trump-era, anglofilo, ultra-neoliberale; e che
rimanere in qualche tipo di relazione con l'Europa - anche se si
tratta solo dell'unione doganale o del mercato unico - è necessario
per proteggere i posti di lavoro. Come risponderebbe?
Lapavitas Ci sono
una serie di questioni. Una riguarda i diritti e le condizioni di
lavoro. L'altra riguarda la capacità di commerciare con l'Europa.
Ovviamente, il mercato unico ha a che fare con entrambi.
In primo
luogo, però, permettetemi di dire che la reazione della sinistra e
del movimento sindacale in Gran Bretagna mi stupisce. E' come se il
movimento sindacale fosse rimasto indietro alla fine degli anni '80,
quando Jacques Delors ha parlato alla conferenza del TUC e ha detto
loro tutte queste cose molto belle che sarebbero accadute in Europa.
Questo non ha nulla a che vedere con l'Unione europea di oggi.
La logica dell'UE
dopo Maastricht - che è arrivata subito dopo - è stata la logica
del mercato unico.
Il mercato unico è un meccanismo di
omogeneizzazione che promuove il neoliberismo, periodo. Si tratta di
un insieme di accordi, principi, che promuovono sistematicamente il
neoliberismo, trovandosi a favore del capitale ogniqualvolta si
presenta una questione critica.
Il mercato unico è un meccanismo
molto potente e uno dei motori principali che lo fa funzionare è la
Corte di giustizia europea (CGCE).
I cittadini non
comprendono l'importanza della Corte di giustizia europea.
Affinché
i mercati funzionino, deve esistere un quadro giuridico.
Il quadro
giuridico in Europa è stato creato sistematicamente negli ultimi
decenni.
È stato creato dal Consiglio dei ministri, che introduce la
maggior parte delle leggi, e dalla Corte di giustizia europea, che le
interpreta e crea anche la giurisprudenza stessa.
Tale meccanismo è
neoliberale in tutto e per tutto.
Non vi sono interessi popolari
espressi in questa struttura.
I singoli sistemi giuridici nazionali,
specifici per ogni paese, sono costretti a conformarsi all'acquis
comunitario, il diritto europeo, che è diventato ormai vasto.
Finché
questo è il caso, la sinistra può dimenticare le sfide radicali ai
rapporti tra capitale e lavoro.
Se la sinistra accetta il mercato
unico, è finito, scordatelo.
Calderbank Se un
governo Corbyn dovesse essere eletto su un manifesto come quello
precedente, in che modo potrebbe essere soggetto ai vincoli derivanti
dall'appartenenza al mercato unico?
Lapavitas In una
varietà di modi che derivano dal quadro giuridico e dalle pratiche
che circondano il mercato unico. Recentemente ho lavorato sugli aiuti
di Stato e sugli appalti pubblici. Un governo di sinistra, un governo
radicale come il Regno Unito, deve utilizzare gli aiuti di Stato e
gli appalti pubblici in modo giudizioso per sostenere l'industria e
creare posti di lavoro e infrastrutture industriali. L'attuale quadro
del mercato unico è concepito in modo tale da impedire un intervento
decisivo in questi settori da parte di un governo di sinistra
radicale. E' possibile concedere aiuti di Stato ed è possibile
utilizzare gli appalti pubblici, ma entro limiti ristretti. Questi
limiti sarebbero troppo restrittivi per un governo radicale come
quello che Jeremy Corbyn vuole introdurre.
Calderbank Quale
sarebbe l'effetto se il commercio dovesse tornare alle regole
dell'OMC? Sarebbe così male come alcuni stanno facendo?
Lapavitas
Permettetemi di dire due cose al riguardo. Prima di tutto, per un
paese capitalista potente come la Gran Bretagna, con la storia che
ha, finire con il governo dei Tory che ha ora - che ovviamente non
può gestire gli affari elementari di Stato - è sorprendente.
Queste
persone sono incapaci di negoziare qualcosa, o di gestire qualcosa.
Quindi non prendiamo gli ultimi due anni di questo governo come
esempio di come un governo di sinistra - uno con i piedi per terra e
l'appoggio del movimento popolare - avrebbe trattato con Brexit.
Se si guarda alla
situazione in senso lato, però, ci sono due questioni molto
importanti. Uno è di che tipo di accordo commerciale ha bisogno il
paese con l'UE? Che cosa significa lasciare il mercato unico diverso
dalle tariffe e così via?
Ovviamente, il
mercato unico è più che tariffe e condizioni di acquisto e di
vendita. Affinché qualsiasi mercato funzioni, è necessario un
quadro di regole, regolamenti, misure, norme, standard , pratiche,
approcci comuni, migliori pratiche in una varietà di settori.
Il
Regno Unito ha chiaramente bisogno di un accordo con l'Unione europea
per quanto riguarda questi aspetti. Dobbiamo gestire gli aeroporti e
i porti, abbiamo bisogno di standard di pratica comuni per gli
spostamenti dei medici e tutto il resto.
Non c'è nulla che dica che
un governo di sinistra non potrebbe farcela dopo l'uscita dal mercato
unico.
La Gran Bretagna rimarrà attaccata all'Europa; è un paese
europeo. Dovremo negoziare tutto questo con l'UE e si tratta di
sedersi e di trovare il miglior accordo possibile.
La seconda questione
ha a che fare con le tariffe e una serie di condizioni legate a
qualsiasi accordo commerciale. In questo caso l'orco che è stato
sollevato è l'OMC: uscire dal mercato unico e poi operare alle
condizioni dell'OMC, il che sarebbe orrendo. Perché?
In primo luogo, la
sinistra non è comunque a favore del libero scambio. Non siamo
liberi commercianti. Crediamo nei controlli.
In secondo luogo, se si
esamina il quadro entro il quale tali controlli saranno esercitati e
gli scambi commerciali, l'OMC, per molti aspetti, è più permissiva
dell'Unione europea, anche per quanto riguarda le questioni degli
aiuti di Stato e degli appalti citati in precedenza.
E' qualcosa di
cui un governo Corbyn può approfittare. Quindi, anche se la Gran
Bretagna dovesse ricadere sulle regole dell'OMC in alcuni settori,
questo creerebbe di fatto più spazio per un governo radicale.
Calderbank
L'argomentazione utilizzata da aziende come Airbus - che è in parte
di proprietà dei governi dell'UE - è che gran parte delle loro
catene di produzione si basano sulla capacità di trattare
l'importazione di parti in tempi così rapidi che non avrebbero altra
scelta che delocalizzare la loro produzione lontano dalla Gran
Bretagna. E' solo una minaccia?
Lapavitas Non c'è
dubbio che sia una minaccia. Le grandi imprese in Gran Bretagna,
chiaramente, non vuole un cambiamento dello status quo.
È chiaro che
la spina dorsale del capitale britannico vuole rimanere nell'UE e
lotterà per essa.
L'UE è un ambiente neoliberale perfetto per le
grandi imprese. Possono realizzare i profitti che cercano. Possono
operare secondo modalità che approvano. Non vogliono alcun
cambiamento, compresa la City of London. La City of London è molto,
molto interessata a che le condizioni attuali non cambino.
Così negli ultimi
mesi abbiamo avuto una campagna sostenuta dalle grandi imprese per
dire che se queste condizioni cambiano, il disastro ci colpirà. No,
non è così.
Dovremmo mantenere la calma, mantenere la calma,
mantenere la calma.
La Gran Bretagna può sopravvivere, può vivere,
al di fuori delle condizioni attuali, purché abbia un governo che
sappia in che modo formulare la politica economica. Non c'è ragione
per cui non si possano prendere accordi sulla regolamentazione dei
mercati e permettere che le catene del valore continuino e che le
merci siano trasportate in tutto il mondo.
Ci sono catene del valore
ovunque, dalla Cina agli Stati Uniti, dal Giappone, dalla Germania e
così via.
Non hanno bisogno di un mercato unico intorno a loro per
funzionare.
Calderbank Tornando
ai negoziati, c'è il pericolo che l'UE voglia esercitare un prezzo
come deterrente politico per il resto d'Europa per non mettere in
discussione la sua autorità?
Lapavitas Non c'è
bisogno di essere ipotetici su questo punto. Possiamo vedere come si
è comportata l'UE nei confronti del Regno Unito negli ultimi due
anni. La sua posizione è stata ostile, inutile, creando problemi a
sinistra, a destra e al centro.
Non ha dato alcun margine di manovra.
Naturalmente, la sinistra dovrebbe essere preparata all'opposizione
dell'Unione europea e a un'alleanza con le grandi imprese
britanniche. Dovrebbe aspettarsi uno sforzo concertato per minare un
governo Corbyn.
Calderbank Questa è
un'alleanza potenzialmente formidabile di interessi potenti. Quindi,
come li sfidiamo?
Lapavitas Crediamo o
no nelle nostre forze? Crediamo nella forza dei lavoratori, nel
potere della classe operaia e degli strati più poveri della società
britannica? Se non lo facciamo, tanto vale fare i bagagli e tornare a
casa.
Se la portata del compito ci spaventa, non ha senso parlare di
socialismo e di ciò che la sinistra dovrebbe fare.
Possiamo
affrontare queste persone e sconfiggerle - naturalmente possiamo.
Possiamo opporci all'UE e alle grandi imprese e possiamo
sconfiggerle.
Dobbiamo affidarci alla forza dell'ostilità della
classe operaia nei confronti dell'attuale regime britannico e
dell'attuale stato degli affari sociali - che è molto profondo.
E
possiamo contare sull'anelito della gente comune per la sovranità
popolare.
La gente vuole
sentirsi al comando di dove vive, di quello che fa, del suo futuro e
del futuro dei suoi figli.
Possiamo fare affidamento su questo e
possiamo mobilitarlo a sostegno di un programma radicale.
C'è molta
forza economica e di altro tipo in Gran Bretagna, e possiamo
mobilitarci in tal senso. Non ho dubbi.
Un governo radicale con un
programma di nazionalizzazione delle risorse chiave, l'acquisizione
di alcune banche e la regolamentazione del sistema bancario, e una
politica industriale che cambierà l'equilibrio dei settori in Gran
Bretagna, avrà grandi possibilità di successo.
Questo è ciò
contro cui l'UE combatterà: una Gran Bretagna radicale di sinistra
che dimostra che c'è un'altra strada. Non lo vogliono.
Calderbank Dato che
l'organizzazione sindacale è molto al di sotto di quanto era negli
anni '70, la capacità del capitale di spiccare il volo in tutto il
mondo, il potere della City di Londra e di finanziare il capitale sul
resto dell'economia - siamo davvero in una posizione strategica
abbastanza forte da scatenare una guerra totale con la classe
dirigente? I vostri critici direbbero che si tratta di una bella
fantasia, ma non tiene conto dell'effettiva debolezza relativa del
potere operaio.
Lapavitas Cerchiamo
di essere chiari su alcune cose. Il programma del Partito Laburista
di due anni fa è fondamentalmente una democrazia sociale radicale e
non di più.
La Gran Bretagna ha ora bisogno di un programma più
radicale, ma che rientrerebbe ancora nell'ampia categoria del
keynesianesimo radicale con qualche fondamento marxista. Non stiamo
parlando di una rivoluzione bolscevica.
Non lasciamoci spaventare dal
cambiamento prima ancora che abbia inizio.
Stiamo parlando di
confrontare lo status quo con un insieme di politiche che sono state
attuate in molti luoghi diversi, ma questa volta più radicali.
Calderbank Pensa che
la sinistra britannica dovrebbe fare affidamento sulle proprie
risorse in questa lotta? Quale ruolo prevedete per la solidarietà
internazionale e paneuropea?
Lapavitas La
sinistra è sempre stata internazionalista. Questo non è
l'internazionalismo del grande capitale, il che significa che il
capitale può andare dove vuole, le merci possono andare dove vuole e
la manodopera può essere spostata ovunque il capitale ne abbia
bisogno.
La sinistra è internazionale nel senso profondo in cui Karl
Marx ha determinato l'idea molte lune fa, quando in sostanza ha detto
che la classe operaia di un paese deve diventare la nazione. La
classe operaia di un paese è internazionale. Non ha un paese, ma
deve diventare la nazione.
In altre parole, deve diventare la classe
dominante e dare la propria visione della nazione, non quella
capitalista.
Questo significa,
per me, che quando pensiamo alla trasformazione sociale e alle
politiche economiche di cui abbiamo bisogno, il primo porto di scalo
è la forza interna - comandare le leve del potere dove viviamo, dove
siamo impiegati, dove siamo attivi.
E' da qui che inizia, non
cercando la forza a Parigi, Lisbona, Roma o in qualsiasi altro luogo.
Prima lo troviamo a Londra, a Glasgow, a Newcastle e così via. Da
qui viene la nostra vera forza, sempre in una prospettiva
internazionale.
La nostra forza sarà
garantita dal ripristino della sovranità popolare. Il popolo
britannico vuole la sovranità popolare.
Vogliono sentirsi al
comando, non che accadano cose su cui non hanno alcun controllo.
Questo è il modo in cui cominciamo ad ottenere il sostegno di cui
abbiamo bisogno a livello nazionale.
Una volta che lo abbiamo fatto e
abbiamo acquisito basi sufficienti per quello che stiamo cercando di
fare dove viviamo, allora, naturalmente, allo stesso tempo,
cercheremo il sostegno internazionale.
Sarebbe un'arma in più per
noi se i lavoratori tedeschi e spagnoli vedessero cosa stiamo facendo
e ci sostenessero. Vogliamo questo, cercheremo di promuoverlo e
sviluppare un movimento in tutta Europa.
Abbiamo tutte le possibilità
di successo, ed è per questo che l'UE ha tanta paura della vittoria
di Corbyn.
Sanno che se
funziona, fungerebbe da modello per gli altri paesi.
L'internazionalismo inizia in casa, non inizia nello spazio
indeterminato là fuori dove galleggiano grandi idee.ù
Calderbank Ci sono
alcuni sulla sinistra, compresa la sinistra greca, che direbbero che
la marea degli eventi a livello globale si sta muovendo oltre i
confini nazionali - il mondo in cui viviamo sta diventando sempre più
internazionalizzato - e l'unico modo per ottenere qualsiasi avanzamento
democratico su queste forze di mercato internazionalizzate è da
parte degli Stati nazionali che lavorano in collaborazione per
esercitare un certo grado di autorità sovranazionale.
Quindi,
piuttosto che quello che vedrebbero come una sorta di ritorno di
sovranità allo Stato nazionale, vedrebbero che il passo necessario è
quello di costruire autorità internazionali che abbiano un certo
grado di sovranità popolare su di loro.
Parlano del tentativo di
lavorare all'interno di istituzioni come l'Unione europea, e di
riformare radicalmente, anziché separarsi da loro.
Lapavitas direi,
all'inizio, che questo argomento - che ovviamente si sente molto a
sinistra - riassume molto bene la profonda malattia che ha colpito la
sinistra europea.
E' una visione tipicamente europea che lo Stato
nazionale è stato trasceso, i confini sono insignificanti e dobbiamo
guardare allo spazio più ampio al di là dello Stato nazionale, che
in ogni caso è velenoso, distruttivo, causa di guerra.
Prima di tutto, in
termini teorici, è un'assurdità.
Non è così che si sta
svolgendo il mondo.
Naturalmente, il capitale si è
internazionalizzato. Naturalmente, abbiamo catene del valore in tutto
il mondo.
Naturalmente, abbiamo quella che si chiama globalizzazione,
vale a dire, in altre parole, la diffusione del commercio in parti
del mondo che non sono state toccate dal capitalismo. Naturalmente,
abbiamo capitale produttivo che crea produzione altrove.
Naturalmente, abbiamo capitale monetario che si muove in varie aree
del mondo e che stabilisce quella che spesso viene chiamata
finanziarizzazione.
Tutti questi sono fenomeni che osserviamo.
Ma l'idea che questo
vada di pari passo con l'eliminazione, o emarginazione, dello stato
nazionale, è un'assurdità.
In realtà, la direzione del movimento
nell'economia globale è determinata da vasti meccanismi statali.
La
Cina non avrebbe mai fatto ciò che ha senza la macchina statale alle
spalle, e senza il Partito Comunista - che, naturalmente, non è un
vero partito comunista ma una macchina parastatale di circa 80-90
milioni di persone.
Gli Stati Uniti non sarebbero mai ciò che sono
senza il governo americano alle spalle. Lo abbiamo visto nella crisi
del 2007-09, quando tutti i profeti della globalizzazione sono andati
a braccetto e hanno chiesto l'intervento per salvarsi la pelle.
Lo Stato non è mai
andato via, è fondamentale per il capitalismo.
E' fondamentale per
lo sviluppo del capitalismo e ciò che fa è intervenire per
promuovere la globalizzazione e la finanziarizzazione.
Nessuno dei
due sarebbe possibile senza il ruolo attivo di potenti meccanismi
statali.
L'Europa è una
varietà di Stati, alcuni dei quali sono considerevoli per gli
standard globali, altri mediocri e molto piccoli.
La direzione
dell'unità politica in Europa dopo la seconda guerra mondiale è
stata caratterizzata inizialmente dalla guerra stessa; poi
dall'intervento degli Stati Uniti e da ciò che essi volevano creare
contro l'URSS; e poi dalla creazione del mercato unico e della regola
del capitale.
Tutti questi fattori hanno plasmato le attuali
prospettive dell'UE. Questa prospettiva è del tutto neoliberale.
Ma
è più di questo. Se la si guarda dal punto di vista degli Stati,
ciò che si vede non è affatto come la fiaba internazionalista che
alcuni sottoscrivono. Ciò che vedete è una gerarchia di Stati che è
spietata come qualsiasi gerarchia che abbiamo visto prima.
Questa gerarchia è
caratterizzata da un nucleo solido dominato dalla Germania, dalla
Francia e da un certo numero di altri paesi, con l'Italia a metà strada, metà outside e un certo numero di periferie.
La periferia
meridionale - Grecia, Spagna, Portogallo - è costituita da economie
deboli, con una base industriale debole e un ampio settore pubblico.
La periferia dell'Europa centrale comprende la Polonia, la Repubblica
Ceca, la Slovacchia, la Slovenia e una serie di altri paesi che sono
fondamentalmente legati alla struttura industriale tedesca. La
periferia del Baltico è un altro bollitore di pesce.
In breve, ciò che
vediamo in Europa è in realtà la gerarchia e la divergenza tra gli
Stati.
Al vertice si trova la Germania. Berlino è il centro del
potere. Berlino prende le vere decisioni. La Francia ha perso in
quella lotta, indipendentemente da ciò che pensa Emmanuel Macron.
Questa è la realtà dell'Europa. In fondo ci sono diversi paesi
periferici, paesi deboli, e sono dominati dal nucleo
centrale.
Abbiamo rapporti di
dominio, nuovi modi in cui si manifesta l'imperialismo.
Questa è la
realtà dell'Europa, non le fiabe di un'alleanza di nazioni, che
supera i confini nazionali, diventando una grande famiglia felice.
Queste cose possono esistere nei sogni delle persone, o negli slogan
politici di varie persone che sostengono l'UE, ma non è questa la
realtà.
In tale contesto,
le idee di sovranità popolare e nazionale sono questioni reali.
Questo è il modo in cui il mondo si muoverà in futuro e dovrebbe
muoversi.
Ora, se questa è la
situazione, cosa si può fare dell'idea che possiamo riunirci tutti
insieme come sinistra, nello spazio indeterminato oltre lo stato
nazionale, e tentare di cambiare l'UE? Possiamo prendere in giro
questa idea in teoria, o analizzando le reali istituzioni dell'UE, ma
non dobbiamo nemmeno farlo. Abbiamo prove storiche, e le prove
storiche si chiamano Syriza.
Syriza era dominata
dall'idea che poteva vincere le elezioni, ottenere legittimità, poi
andare nei forum dell'Europa.
Sostiene la sua tesi, otterrebbe il
sostegno di altre parti della sinistra europea e di altri paesi, e
poi riuscirebbe a cambiare l'equilibrio delle forze e la vera bontà
dell'Europa emergerebbe e tutto sarebbe bello.
Nulla di tutto ciò è
mai stato realizzato.
L'UE che Syriza ha dovuto affrontare era questa
forza ostile e arrogante che sostanzialmente ha detto a Syriza cosa
fare e ha ricattato spietatamente il governo di sinistra.
Questo è
esattamente ciò con cui qualsiasi tentativo di creare questo fronte
internazionale di sinistra sarebbe confrontato. Non è una politica
realistica.
La politica realistica inizia in casa. Comincia da casa,
inizia con cose che puoi comandare e cose che puoi cambiare. Su
questo si costruisce l'internazionalismo.
Il caso di sinistra
contro l'UE di Costas Lapavitsas sarà pubblicato da Polity Press.
Con i ringraziamenti a Ed Dingwall.
English original version
Costas Lapavitsas The book is obviously a critique of the EU as it stands. It’s an assessment of where the union is, what it has become, and its likely direction. It is an attempt to say that the left should have nothing to do with defending this set of institutions. It should assume a critical, rejectionist position. I am asserting that this is the only way you can develop radical politics in Europe, a radical and internationalist economic and social programme.
Michael Calderbank The most obvious comeback would be that the forces threatening to tear apart the EU – the populists in Italy, or the AfD in Germany – are anti-immigrant, right-wing, and that if the EU disintegrates, it will be the right that benefits. How would you respond to that?
Lapavitsas Let me say at the beginning that, of course, we should have nothing to do with these reactionary, racist forces. We should oppose them across the board. But to understand why they have become so powerful, and to understand what we should do, we must start with the EU itself. The emergence of these forces is not accidental. It has to do with what the EU has become. Only by starting from that perspective can we understand what the left should do.
So why is the extreme right so powerful and the EU in this state? The first thing to appreciate is that the EU faces an existential crisis unlike any in the past. It goes to the heart of what it is, what it does and what interests it serves. It is a crisis that has resulted from the deep transformation since Maastricht.
Maastricht was a key moment. What’s happened since is that the EU has emerged as an uncompromising defender of capital against labour, a promoter of neoliberalism, with a very rigid set of mechanisms that bulldozes its way through any kind of opposition. This isn’t the alliance of nations, the partnership of peoples and all the other fancy words that people continue to imagine on the left in Britain – often harking back to the late 1980s, Jacques Delors and so on. The EU today has only a faint connection with those days. It has hollowed out democracy in Europe. It has removed popular sovereignty, and it has alienated the poor and the working class in country after country. The political result is what you see. It’s a visceral, from-below reaction, which goes to the right because the left offers no alternative perspective.
Calderbank Does it surprise you how the debate is running on the left in Britain? The trade union leaderships, for example, would point to an at least vestigial basis of social and economic protections, or environmental protections. They argue that even if they’ve been under attack they still exist to a greater extent than might be the case in a Trump-era, Anglophile, ultra-neoliberal experiment; and that staying in some kind of relationship with Europe – even if it’s only the customs union or single market – is necessary to protect jobs. How would you respond?
Lapavitsas There are a number of issues. One is to do with labour rights and conditions. The other is to do with the ability to trade with Europe. Obviously, the single market has something to do with both. But first, let me say that the reaction of the left and the trade union movement in Britain astonishes me. It is as if the trade union movement has stayed back in the late 80s, when Jacques Delors addressed the TUC conference and told them all these very nice things that were going to happen in Europe. That has nothing to do with the EU today.
The logic of the EU since Maastricht – which came soon after – has been the logic of the single market. The single market is a homogenising mechanism that promotes neoliberalism, period. It’s a set of agreements, principles, that systematically promote neoliberalism by finding in favour of capital whenever a critical issue arises. The single market is a very powerful mechanism, and one of the key engines that makes it work is the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
People don’t understand the importance of the ECJ. For markets to work there has to be a legal framework. The legal framework in Europe has been systematically created in the last few decades. It’s been created by the Council of Ministers, which introduces most laws, and by the ECJ, which interprets them and also creates case law itself. That mechanism is neoliberal through and through. There are no popular interests expressed in this setup. Individual, country-specific, national legal systems are forced to comply with the acquis communautaire, European law, which has now become vast. As long as that’s the case, the left can forget about radical challenges to relations between capital and labour. If the left accepts the single market, it’s finished, forget it.
Calderbank If a Corbyn government was to be elected on a manifesto like its previous one, in what way might it face constraints from single market membership?
Lapavitsas In a variety of ways emanating from the legal framework and the practices that surround the single market. Recently I’ve done some work on state aid and procurement. A left government, a radical government such as the UK needs, must use state aid and procurement judiciously to support industry, and create jobs and the industrial infrastructure. The current single market framework is designed in such a way as to stop decisive intervention in these fields by a radical left government. It is possible to give state aid, and it is possible to use procurement, but within narrow limits. These limits would be too restrictive for a radical government such as Jeremy Corbyn wants to introduce.
Calderbank What might be the effect if trade were to revert to WTO rules? Would it be as bad as some are making out?
Lapavitsas Let me say two things about that. First of all, for a powerful capitalist country such as Britain, with the history it has, to end up with the Tory government it has now – that obviously cannot manage elementary affairs of state – is astonishing. These people are incapable of negotiating anything, or of managing anything. So let’s not take the last two years of this government as an example of how a left government – one with its feet on the ground and backing from the popular movement – would have dealt with Brexit.
When you look at the situation more broadly, however, there are two issues that are very important. One is what kind of trade deal does the country need with the EU? What does it mean to leave the single market other than tariffs and so on?
Obviously, the single market is more than tariffs and conditions of buying and selling. For any market to work, you need a framework of rules, regulations, measures, standards, practices, common approaches, best practice in a variety of fields. Britain clearly needs a deal with the EU as far as these things are concerned. We need to operate the airports and ports, we need to have common practice standards for doctors to move around and everything else. There is nothing that says that a left government couldn’t manage this after exiting the single market. Britain will remain attached to Europe; it’s a European country. We will have to negotiate all that with the EU and it’s a matter of sitting down and working out the best arrangement.
The second issue has to do with tariffs and a variety of conditions attached to any trade deal. Here the ogre that has been raised is the WTO: exiting the single market, then operating under WTO conditions, which would apparently be horrendous. Why?
First, the left is not in favour of free trade anyway. We are not free traders. We believe in controls. Second, when you look at the framework within which these controls will be exercised and trade will be practiced, the WTO, in many ways, is more permissive than the EU, including on the issues of state aid and procurement mentioned previously. That’s something a Corbyn government can take advantage of. So, even if Britain had to fall back on WTO rules in certain areas, that would actually create more space for a radical government.
Calderbank The argument used by companies such as Airbus – which is partly owned by EU governments – is that so much of their manufacturing supply chains are based on the just-in-time ability to process the import of parts extremely quickly that they would have no choice but to relocate their manufacturing away from Britain. Is that just a threat?
Lapavitsas There is no question it’s a threat. Big business in Britain, quite clearly, doesn’t want a change in the status quo. It’s clear that the backbone of British capital wants to stay in the EU and will fight for it. The EU is a perfect neoliberal environment for big business. They can make the profits they seek. They can operate in ways they approve of. They don’t want any change, including the City of London. The City of London is very, very keen for present conditions not to change.
So for the last few months we’ve had a sustained campaign by big business to say that if these conditions change disaster will befall us. No, that’s not the case. We should keep calm, keep our cool. Britain can survive, can live, outside present conditions so long as it has a government that knows which way to formulate economic policy. There is no reason why we couldn’t strike arrangements on the regulation of markets and allow the value chains to continue and goods to be moved around the world. There are value chains everywhere, from China to the US, Japan, Germany, and so on. They don’t have to have a single market around them to work.
Calderbank Coming back to the negotiations, is it a danger that the EU wants to exert a price as a political deterrent to the rest of Europe not to challenge its authority?
Lapavitsas We don’t have to be hypothetical about this. We can look at how the EU has behaved toward Britain over the last two years. Its stance has been hostile, unhelpful, creating problems left, right and centre. It has given no leeway at all. Of course, the left should be prepared for opposition from the EU, and an alliance with big business in Britain. It should expect a concerted effort to undermine a Corbyn government.
Calderbank That’s a potentially formidable alliance of powerful interests. So how do we challenge them?
Lapavitsas Do we believe in our own strength or not? Do we believe in the strength of working people, the power of the working class and the poorer layers of British society? If we don’t, we might as well pack up and go home. If the magnitude of the task scares us, there is no point talking about socialism and what the left should do. We can confront these people and defeat them – of course we can. We can oppose the EU and big business and we can defeat them. We should rely on the strength of working-class hostility towards the current regime in Britain and the current state of social affairs – which is very deep. And we can rely on the yearning of ordinary people for popular sovereignty.
People want to feel in command of where they live, what they do, their future and their children’s future. We can rely on that, and we can mobilise it behind a radical programme. There is a lot of economic and other strength in Britain, and we can mobilise that. I’ve got no doubt. A radical government with a programme of nationalising key resources, taking over certain banks and regulating the banking system, and an industrial policy that will change the balance of sectors in Britain, will have great scope for success. That is what the EU would be fighting against – a radical left-wing Britain showing that there is another way. They don’t want that.
Calderbank Given that trade union organisation is a long way below what it was in the 1970s, the capacity of capital to take flight across the world, the power of the City of London and finance capital over the rest of the economy – are we really in a strong enough strategic position to wage that degree of all-out war with the ruling class? Your critics would say that’s a nice-sounding fantasy, but it doesn’t take into account the actual relative weakness of working-class power.
Lapavitsas Let’s be clear about a number of things. The Labour Party programme of two years ago is basically radical social democracy and no more. Britain now needs a more radical programme but one that would still fall within the broad rubric of radical Keynesianism with some Marxist underpinnings. We are not talking about a Bolshevik revolution. Let’s not be scared by change before it even starts. We are talking about confronting the status quo with a set of policies that have been implemented in many different places, but more radical this time.
Calderbank Do you think that the British left would have to rely on its own resources in that fight? What role do you foresee for international, pan-European solidarity?
Lapavitsas The left has always been internationalist. This is not the internationalism of big capital, which means that capital can go anywhere it likes, commodities can go anywhere they like, and labour can be moved anywhere that capital needs it. The left is international in the profound sense in which Karl Marx determined the idea many moons ago, when he basically said that the working class of a country must become the nation. The working class of a country is international. It doesn’t have a country, but it must become the nation. In other words, it must become the dominant class and give its own outlook to the nation, not the capitalist outlook.
That means, for me, that when we think of social transformation and the economic policies we need, the first port of call is domestic strength — commanding the levers of power where we live, where we are employed, where we’re active. That is where it starts, not by seeking strength in Paris, Lisbon, Rome, or wherever else. First, we find it in London, in Glasgow, in Newcastle, and so on. That’s where our true strength comes from, always with an international perspective however.
Our strength will be guaranteed by reinstituting popular sovereignty. The British people want popular sovereignty. They want to feel that they are in command, rather than that things are happening over which they have no control. That’s the way we begin to gain the support we need nationally. Once we’ve done that and we’ve acquired sufficient foundations for what we’re trying to do where we live, then of course at the same time we’ll seek international support. It would be an added weapon for us if German and Spanish workers saw what we’re doing and supported us. We want that, we will try and promote it and develop a movement across Europe. We’ve got every chance of succeeding, which is why the EU is so scared of a Corbyn victory. They know that if it works, it would act as a model for other countries. Internationalism starts at home, it doesn’t start in the indeterminate space out there where big ideas float.
Calderbank There are some on the left, including on the Greek left, who would say the tide of events globally is moving beyond national boundaries – the world we live in is becoming increasingly internationalized –and the only way of getting any democratic purchase over these internationalised market forces is by nation states working collaboratively to exercise some degree of supranational authority. Therefore, rather than what they would see as a kind of backward-looking return of sovereignty to the nation state, they would see the necessary step is to build international authorities that have some degree of popular sovereignty over them. They are talking about the attempt to work inside, and radically reform, institutions like the EU, rather than separate away from them.
Lapavitsas I would say, at the outset, that this argument – which of course one hears extensively across the left – sums up very neatly the profound illness that has befallen the European left. It’s a characteristically European outlook that the nation state has been transcended, borders are insignificant and we must look at the grander space beyond the nation state, which in any case is poisonous, destructive, the cause of war.
First of all, in theoretical terms, it’s arrant nonsense. That is not how the world is unfolding. Of course, capital has become internationalised. Of course, we’ve got value chains across the world. Of course, we’ve got what is called globalisation – meaning, in other words, the spread of commerce into parts of the world that were untouched by capitalism. Of course, we have productive capital setting up production elsewhere. Of course, we’ve got money capital moving into various areas of the world and establishing what is often called financialisation. All of these are phenomena that we observe.
But the notion that this goes with the elimination, or marginalisation, of the nation state, is nonsense. In reality, the direction of movement in the global economy is determined by vast state mechanisms. China would never have done what it has without the state machine behind it, and without the Communist Party – which, of course, is not a real communist party but a parastatal machine of about 80-90 million people. The US would never be what it is without the US government behind it. We saw that in the crisis of 2007-09, when all the prophets of globalisation went cap in hand and begged for intervention to save their skins.
The state never went away, it is fundamental to capitalism. It is pivotal to how capitalism develops, and what it does is intervene to promote globalisation and financialisation. Neither would be possible without the active role of powerful state mechanisms.
Europe is a variety of states, some of which are sizable by global standards, some middling, and a lot small. The direction of political unity in Europe since the second world war was characterised to begin with by the war itself; then by US intervention and what it wanted to create against the USSR; and then by the creation of the single market and the rule of capital. All these factors have shaped the current outlook of the EU. This outlook is thoroughly neoliberal. But it’s more than that. When you look at it from the perspective of states, what you see is nothing like the internationalist fairy story that some subscribe to. What you see is a hierarchy of states that is every bit as ruthless as any hierarchy we’ve seen before.
This hierarchy is characterised by a solid core dominated by Germany, France and a number of other countries, with Italy half-core, half-outside, and a number of peripheries. The southern periphery – Greece, Spain, Portugal – consists of weak economies with a weak industrial base and a large public sector. The central European periphery includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and a number of other countries that are basically attached to the German industrial structure. The Baltic periphery is a different kettle of fish altogether.
In a nutshell, what we see in Europe is actually hierarchy and divergence among states. At the top sits Germany. Berlin is the centre of power. Berlin takes the real decisions. France has actually lost out in that struggle, no matter what Emmanuel Macron thinks. That’s the reality of Europe. At the bottom sit a number of peripheral countries, weak countries, and they are dominated by the core.
We have relations of domination, new ways in which imperialism manifests itself. That’s the reality of Europe, not the fairy stories of an alliance of nations, overcoming national borders, becoming one big, happy family. These things might exist in people’s dreams, or in political slogans of various people who support the EU, but that’s not the reality. In that context, the ideas of popular and national sovereignty are real issues. That’s the way in which the world will move in the future and should move.
Now, if that’s the situation, what does one make of the idea that we can all club together as the left, in the indeterminate space beyond the nation state, and attempt to change the EU? We can poke fun at this idea in theory, or by analyzing the actual institutions of the EU, but we don’t even have to do that. We have historical evidence, and that historical evidence is called Syriza.
Syriza was dominated by the notion that it could win elections, gain legitimacy, then go to the fora of Europe. It would argue its case, it would get support from other parts of the European left and other countries, and then it would succeed in changing the balance of forces and the true goodness of Europe would emerge and everything would be lovely. None of this ever came anywhere near realisation. The EU that Syriza faced was this hostile, arrogant force that basically told Syriza what to do and blackmailed the left government ruthlessly.
That’s exactly what any kind of ill-thought out attempt to create this international front of the left would be confronted with. It is not realistic politics. Realistic politics starts at home. Start at home, start with things you can command and things you can change. Internationalism is built on that.
The Left Case Against the EU by Costas Lapavitsas will be published by Polity Press. With thanks to Ed Dingwall.
English original version
Costas Lapavitsas: Socialism starts at home
Michael Calderbank speaks to Marxist economist Costas Lapavitsas ahead of the publication of his provocative new book The Left Case Against the EU
Costas Lapavitsas The book is obviously a critique of the EU as it stands. It’s an assessment of where the union is, what it has become, and its likely direction. It is an attempt to say that the left should have nothing to do with defending this set of institutions. It should assume a critical, rejectionist position. I am asserting that this is the only way you can develop radical politics in Europe, a radical and internationalist economic and social programme.
Michael Calderbank The most obvious comeback would be that the forces threatening to tear apart the EU – the populists in Italy, or the AfD in Germany – are anti-immigrant, right-wing, and that if the EU disintegrates, it will be the right that benefits. How would you respond to that?
Lapavitsas Let me say at the beginning that, of course, we should have nothing to do with these reactionary, racist forces. We should oppose them across the board. But to understand why they have become so powerful, and to understand what we should do, we must start with the EU itself. The emergence of these forces is not accidental. It has to do with what the EU has become. Only by starting from that perspective can we understand what the left should do.
So why is the extreme right so powerful and the EU in this state? The first thing to appreciate is that the EU faces an existential crisis unlike any in the past. It goes to the heart of what it is, what it does and what interests it serves. It is a crisis that has resulted from the deep transformation since Maastricht.
Maastricht was a key moment. What’s happened since is that the EU has emerged as an uncompromising defender of capital against labour, a promoter of neoliberalism, with a very rigid set of mechanisms that bulldozes its way through any kind of opposition. This isn’t the alliance of nations, the partnership of peoples and all the other fancy words that people continue to imagine on the left in Britain – often harking back to the late 1980s, Jacques Delors and so on. The EU today has only a faint connection with those days. It has hollowed out democracy in Europe. It has removed popular sovereignty, and it has alienated the poor and the working class in country after country. The political result is what you see. It’s a visceral, from-below reaction, which goes to the right because the left offers no alternative perspective.
Calderbank Does it surprise you how the debate is running on the left in Britain? The trade union leaderships, for example, would point to an at least vestigial basis of social and economic protections, or environmental protections. They argue that even if they’ve been under attack they still exist to a greater extent than might be the case in a Trump-era, Anglophile, ultra-neoliberal experiment; and that staying in some kind of relationship with Europe – even if it’s only the customs union or single market – is necessary to protect jobs. How would you respond?
Lapavitsas There are a number of issues. One is to do with labour rights and conditions. The other is to do with the ability to trade with Europe. Obviously, the single market has something to do with both. But first, let me say that the reaction of the left and the trade union movement in Britain astonishes me. It is as if the trade union movement has stayed back in the late 80s, when Jacques Delors addressed the TUC conference and told them all these very nice things that were going to happen in Europe. That has nothing to do with the EU today.
The logic of the EU since Maastricht – which came soon after – has been the logic of the single market. The single market is a homogenising mechanism that promotes neoliberalism, period. It’s a set of agreements, principles, that systematically promote neoliberalism by finding in favour of capital whenever a critical issue arises. The single market is a very powerful mechanism, and one of the key engines that makes it work is the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
People don’t understand the importance of the ECJ. For markets to work there has to be a legal framework. The legal framework in Europe has been systematically created in the last few decades. It’s been created by the Council of Ministers, which introduces most laws, and by the ECJ, which interprets them and also creates case law itself. That mechanism is neoliberal through and through. There are no popular interests expressed in this setup. Individual, country-specific, national legal systems are forced to comply with the acquis communautaire, European law, which has now become vast. As long as that’s the case, the left can forget about radical challenges to relations between capital and labour. If the left accepts the single market, it’s finished, forget it.
Calderbank If a Corbyn government was to be elected on a manifesto like its previous one, in what way might it face constraints from single market membership?
Lapavitsas In a variety of ways emanating from the legal framework and the practices that surround the single market. Recently I’ve done some work on state aid and procurement. A left government, a radical government such as the UK needs, must use state aid and procurement judiciously to support industry, and create jobs and the industrial infrastructure. The current single market framework is designed in such a way as to stop decisive intervention in these fields by a radical left government. It is possible to give state aid, and it is possible to use procurement, but within narrow limits. These limits would be too restrictive for a radical government such as Jeremy Corbyn wants to introduce.
Calderbank What might be the effect if trade were to revert to WTO rules? Would it be as bad as some are making out?
Lapavitsas Let me say two things about that. First of all, for a powerful capitalist country such as Britain, with the history it has, to end up with the Tory government it has now – that obviously cannot manage elementary affairs of state – is astonishing. These people are incapable of negotiating anything, or of managing anything. So let’s not take the last two years of this government as an example of how a left government – one with its feet on the ground and backing from the popular movement – would have dealt with Brexit.
When you look at the situation more broadly, however, there are two issues that are very important. One is what kind of trade deal does the country need with the EU? What does it mean to leave the single market other than tariffs and so on?
Obviously, the single market is more than tariffs and conditions of buying and selling. For any market to work, you need a framework of rules, regulations, measures, standards, practices, common approaches, best practice in a variety of fields. Britain clearly needs a deal with the EU as far as these things are concerned. We need to operate the airports and ports, we need to have common practice standards for doctors to move around and everything else. There is nothing that says that a left government couldn’t manage this after exiting the single market. Britain will remain attached to Europe; it’s a European country. We will have to negotiate all that with the EU and it’s a matter of sitting down and working out the best arrangement.
The second issue has to do with tariffs and a variety of conditions attached to any trade deal. Here the ogre that has been raised is the WTO: exiting the single market, then operating under WTO conditions, which would apparently be horrendous. Why?
First, the left is not in favour of free trade anyway. We are not free traders. We believe in controls. Second, when you look at the framework within which these controls will be exercised and trade will be practiced, the WTO, in many ways, is more permissive than the EU, including on the issues of state aid and procurement mentioned previously. That’s something a Corbyn government can take advantage of. So, even if Britain had to fall back on WTO rules in certain areas, that would actually create more space for a radical government.
Calderbank The argument used by companies such as Airbus – which is partly owned by EU governments – is that so much of their manufacturing supply chains are based on the just-in-time ability to process the import of parts extremely quickly that they would have no choice but to relocate their manufacturing away from Britain. Is that just a threat?
Lapavitsas There is no question it’s a threat. Big business in Britain, quite clearly, doesn’t want a change in the status quo. It’s clear that the backbone of British capital wants to stay in the EU and will fight for it. The EU is a perfect neoliberal environment for big business. They can make the profits they seek. They can operate in ways they approve of. They don’t want any change, including the City of London. The City of London is very, very keen for present conditions not to change.
So for the last few months we’ve had a sustained campaign by big business to say that if these conditions change disaster will befall us. No, that’s not the case. We should keep calm, keep our cool. Britain can survive, can live, outside present conditions so long as it has a government that knows which way to formulate economic policy. There is no reason why we couldn’t strike arrangements on the regulation of markets and allow the value chains to continue and goods to be moved around the world. There are value chains everywhere, from China to the US, Japan, Germany, and so on. They don’t have to have a single market around them to work.
Calderbank Coming back to the negotiations, is it a danger that the EU wants to exert a price as a political deterrent to the rest of Europe not to challenge its authority?
Lapavitsas We don’t have to be hypothetical about this. We can look at how the EU has behaved toward Britain over the last two years. Its stance has been hostile, unhelpful, creating problems left, right and centre. It has given no leeway at all. Of course, the left should be prepared for opposition from the EU, and an alliance with big business in Britain. It should expect a concerted effort to undermine a Corbyn government.
Calderbank That’s a potentially formidable alliance of powerful interests. So how do we challenge them?
Lapavitsas Do we believe in our own strength or not? Do we believe in the strength of working people, the power of the working class and the poorer layers of British society? If we don’t, we might as well pack up and go home. If the magnitude of the task scares us, there is no point talking about socialism and what the left should do. We can confront these people and defeat them – of course we can. We can oppose the EU and big business and we can defeat them. We should rely on the strength of working-class hostility towards the current regime in Britain and the current state of social affairs – which is very deep. And we can rely on the yearning of ordinary people for popular sovereignty.
People want to feel in command of where they live, what they do, their future and their children’s future. We can rely on that, and we can mobilise it behind a radical programme. There is a lot of economic and other strength in Britain, and we can mobilise that. I’ve got no doubt. A radical government with a programme of nationalising key resources, taking over certain banks and regulating the banking system, and an industrial policy that will change the balance of sectors in Britain, will have great scope for success. That is what the EU would be fighting against – a radical left-wing Britain showing that there is another way. They don’t want that.
Calderbank Given that trade union organisation is a long way below what it was in the 1970s, the capacity of capital to take flight across the world, the power of the City of London and finance capital over the rest of the economy – are we really in a strong enough strategic position to wage that degree of all-out war with the ruling class? Your critics would say that’s a nice-sounding fantasy, but it doesn’t take into account the actual relative weakness of working-class power.
Lapavitsas Let’s be clear about a number of things. The Labour Party programme of two years ago is basically radical social democracy and no more. Britain now needs a more radical programme but one that would still fall within the broad rubric of radical Keynesianism with some Marxist underpinnings. We are not talking about a Bolshevik revolution. Let’s not be scared by change before it even starts. We are talking about confronting the status quo with a set of policies that have been implemented in many different places, but more radical this time.
Calderbank Do you think that the British left would have to rely on its own resources in that fight? What role do you foresee for international, pan-European solidarity?
Lapavitsas The left has always been internationalist. This is not the internationalism of big capital, which means that capital can go anywhere it likes, commodities can go anywhere they like, and labour can be moved anywhere that capital needs it. The left is international in the profound sense in which Karl Marx determined the idea many moons ago, when he basically said that the working class of a country must become the nation. The working class of a country is international. It doesn’t have a country, but it must become the nation. In other words, it must become the dominant class and give its own outlook to the nation, not the capitalist outlook.
That means, for me, that when we think of social transformation and the economic policies we need, the first port of call is domestic strength — commanding the levers of power where we live, where we are employed, where we’re active. That is where it starts, not by seeking strength in Paris, Lisbon, Rome, or wherever else. First, we find it in London, in Glasgow, in Newcastle, and so on. That’s where our true strength comes from, always with an international perspective however.
Our strength will be guaranteed by reinstituting popular sovereignty. The British people want popular sovereignty. They want to feel that they are in command, rather than that things are happening over which they have no control. That’s the way we begin to gain the support we need nationally. Once we’ve done that and we’ve acquired sufficient foundations for what we’re trying to do where we live, then of course at the same time we’ll seek international support. It would be an added weapon for us if German and Spanish workers saw what we’re doing and supported us. We want that, we will try and promote it and develop a movement across Europe. We’ve got every chance of succeeding, which is why the EU is so scared of a Corbyn victory. They know that if it works, it would act as a model for other countries. Internationalism starts at home, it doesn’t start in the indeterminate space out there where big ideas float.
Calderbank There are some on the left, including on the Greek left, who would say the tide of events globally is moving beyond national boundaries – the world we live in is becoming increasingly internationalized –and the only way of getting any democratic purchase over these internationalised market forces is by nation states working collaboratively to exercise some degree of supranational authority. Therefore, rather than what they would see as a kind of backward-looking return of sovereignty to the nation state, they would see the necessary step is to build international authorities that have some degree of popular sovereignty over them. They are talking about the attempt to work inside, and radically reform, institutions like the EU, rather than separate away from them.
Lapavitsas I would say, at the outset, that this argument – which of course one hears extensively across the left – sums up very neatly the profound illness that has befallen the European left. It’s a characteristically European outlook that the nation state has been transcended, borders are insignificant and we must look at the grander space beyond the nation state, which in any case is poisonous, destructive, the cause of war.
First of all, in theoretical terms, it’s arrant nonsense. That is not how the world is unfolding. Of course, capital has become internationalised. Of course, we’ve got value chains across the world. Of course, we’ve got what is called globalisation – meaning, in other words, the spread of commerce into parts of the world that were untouched by capitalism. Of course, we have productive capital setting up production elsewhere. Of course, we’ve got money capital moving into various areas of the world and establishing what is often called financialisation. All of these are phenomena that we observe.
But the notion that this goes with the elimination, or marginalisation, of the nation state, is nonsense. In reality, the direction of movement in the global economy is determined by vast state mechanisms. China would never have done what it has without the state machine behind it, and without the Communist Party – which, of course, is not a real communist party but a parastatal machine of about 80-90 million people. The US would never be what it is without the US government behind it. We saw that in the crisis of 2007-09, when all the prophets of globalisation went cap in hand and begged for intervention to save their skins.
The state never went away, it is fundamental to capitalism. It is pivotal to how capitalism develops, and what it does is intervene to promote globalisation and financialisation. Neither would be possible without the active role of powerful state mechanisms.
Europe is a variety of states, some of which are sizable by global standards, some middling, and a lot small. The direction of political unity in Europe since the second world war was characterised to begin with by the war itself; then by US intervention and what it wanted to create against the USSR; and then by the creation of the single market and the rule of capital. All these factors have shaped the current outlook of the EU. This outlook is thoroughly neoliberal. But it’s more than that. When you look at it from the perspective of states, what you see is nothing like the internationalist fairy story that some subscribe to. What you see is a hierarchy of states that is every bit as ruthless as any hierarchy we’ve seen before.
This hierarchy is characterised by a solid core dominated by Germany, France and a number of other countries, with Italy half-core, half-outside, and a number of peripheries. The southern periphery – Greece, Spain, Portugal – consists of weak economies with a weak industrial base and a large public sector. The central European periphery includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and a number of other countries that are basically attached to the German industrial structure. The Baltic periphery is a different kettle of fish altogether.
In a nutshell, what we see in Europe is actually hierarchy and divergence among states. At the top sits Germany. Berlin is the centre of power. Berlin takes the real decisions. France has actually lost out in that struggle, no matter what Emmanuel Macron thinks. That’s the reality of Europe. At the bottom sit a number of peripheral countries, weak countries, and they are dominated by the core.
We have relations of domination, new ways in which imperialism manifests itself. That’s the reality of Europe, not the fairy stories of an alliance of nations, overcoming national borders, becoming one big, happy family. These things might exist in people’s dreams, or in political slogans of various people who support the EU, but that’s not the reality. In that context, the ideas of popular and national sovereignty are real issues. That’s the way in which the world will move in the future and should move.
Now, if that’s the situation, what does one make of the idea that we can all club together as the left, in the indeterminate space beyond the nation state, and attempt to change the EU? We can poke fun at this idea in theory, or by analyzing the actual institutions of the EU, but we don’t even have to do that. We have historical evidence, and that historical evidence is called Syriza.
Syriza was dominated by the notion that it could win elections, gain legitimacy, then go to the fora of Europe. It would argue its case, it would get support from other parts of the European left and other countries, and then it would succeed in changing the balance of forces and the true goodness of Europe would emerge and everything would be lovely. None of this ever came anywhere near realisation. The EU that Syriza faced was this hostile, arrogant force that basically told Syriza what to do and blackmailed the left government ruthlessly.
That’s exactly what any kind of ill-thought out attempt to create this international front of the left would be confronted with. It is not realistic politics. Realistic politics starts at home. Start at home, start with things you can command and things you can change. Internationalism is built on that.
The Left Case Against the EU by Costas Lapavitsas will be published by Polity Press. With thanks to Ed Dingwall.
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